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ABSTRACT
MENEVIS CILIZOGLU: Do Intergovernmental Organizations Pacify or Facilitate
Sanctioning Behavior?
(Under the direction of Mark Crescenzi.)
Does shared membership in intergovernmental organizations pacify sanctioning behavior or fa-
cilitate it? Do states shy away from sanctioning a state that they are highly connected to through
institutions? I argue that at the threat level, IGOs serve as a channel through which threats are
credibly communicated. At the imposition stage IGOs solve bargaining problems embedded
in sanctions by mitigating information asymmetries and help states solve contentious issues
through enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms. I find that states with high number of
joint membership in IGOs threaten each other more often than less connected states, especially
for trade-related issues. The pacifying effect of IGOs exists at the imposition stage; however,
the scope of it is limited to the IGOs with a security mandate. The empirical analysis for all
sanctions imposed in the years 1950-2000 suggests that IGOs with economic mandates fail to
deter states from imposing trade-related sanctions. Security IGOs, on the other hand, perform
well in decreasing the probability of security-related sanctions. This paper also reveals that
there is a lot to learn from the variation among IGOs as well as the variation among sanctions.
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Introduction
Sanctions and threats of sanctions have become frequent foreign policy tools in world pol-
itics. There has been a recent surge in interest and scholarly research in the area of sanctions.
The main focus of the sanctions literature has been on the effectiveness of sanctions and the
conditions under which sanctions succeed or fail. However, far too little attention has been
devoted to the reasons why sanctions emerge in the first place. The question of sanction ef-
fectiveness can neither be analyzed theoretically nor tested empirically independent from the
states’ decision to impose them. Therefore, this paper aims to take a step back and identify the
reasons why states resort to sanctions or threats of it as a foreign policy tool. What prompts the
initial attempt at economic coercion? What factors shy states away from imposing sanctions,
and what factors make sanctions a viable option to resolve contentious issues?
I turn to the effect of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to answer these questions.
The literature on the ability of international institutions to promote peace among their members
is rich, and the pacifying effect of shared membership in IGOs in militarized disputes is well
established (Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom 2004; Oneal and Russett 2001; Shannon, Morey
and Boehmke 2010). What is not yet clear is the role of IGOs in lower intensity conflicts. We
have abundant evidence suggesting that shared membership in IGOs decreases the probability
of fighting, but we do not know if IGOs also discourage states from engaging in lower intensity
conflicts, such as economic sanctions. One of the main purposes of this study is to find out
whether or not IGOs influence state decisions with regards to sanction episodes1? I will try to
find out shared membership in intergovernmental organizations pacify sanctioning behavior or
facilitate it?
I differentiate IGOs based on their primary mandates and sanctions based on the issue under
1Sanction episodes are initiated either by a threat of sanctions or a sanction imposition. States are considered to be
in a sanction episode when a threat of sanction is sent from the sender to the target or when a sanction is imposed
between the two states.
contention. Furthermore, I match sanction episodes with relevant IGOs, assuming that IGOs
do not influence state decisions on sanctions outside their mandates. I find that the states with
higher levels of shared IGO membership are more likely to threaten one another with sanctions.
This relationship is not very clear for threats on security issues channeled through security
IGOs; however, it is evident for trade-related sanction threats. At the imposition stage, I find
that the pacifying effect of IGOs in sanction episodes is only limited to IGOs with a security
mandate. Security IGOs do a good job in preventing their members to sanction each other for
security issues. The results suggest that economic IGOs fail to pacify states in solving their
trade related disputes.
These findings have important implications for the literature on intergovernmental orga-
nizations. The literature has been dominantly focused on the role of IGOs in high-intensity
conflicts; however their influence is also evident in low-intensity conflicts. Moreover, the re-
sults reinforce the commonly accepted finding that equating IGOs, as well as sanctions, and not
accounting for the variation among them will lead to misleading results.
Literature Review
Research on sanctions and intergovernmental organizations have bloomed recently, but the
scholarly attention to the intersection between the two research agendas is inadequate and lim-
ited in scope. Scholars have often conceptualized IGO involvement as a facilitator of coop-
eration among senders of sanctions (Martin 1992). The main interest at the intersection of
sanctions and IGOs is uncovering the effectiveness of unilateral versus multilateral sanctions.
Most of the early literature had argued that multilateral sanctions have little to no effect on
sanction success (Haufbauer et al. 2009). Others had argued that multilateral sanctions and
involvement of IGOs are counterproductive (Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004). However,
with the advancement of the data on sanctions, it has been acknowledged that it is the otherwise
(Bapat and Morgan 2009). Although extensive research has been carried about the role of IGOs
on sanction effectiveness, much uncertainty still exists about the influence of IGOs prior to ini-
tiation of sanction episodes. We still do not know whether or not IGOs influence the sender’s
decision to threaten targets with sanctions or impose sanctions on them.
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Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2008) look explicitly at the impact of institutions on sanc-
tion onset, but they limit their focus to Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA). This line of re-
search also offers contradictory findings. Some argue that states that are connected through
PTAs shy away from imposing sanctions, because they are basically two opposing policy op-
tions (Hufbauer 2000). However, some argue that mutual memberships in PTAs has no effect
on the propensity of states to sanction each other (Gallarotti 1991). Despite the lack of a con-
clusive answer about the impact of shared memberships in PTAs on sanctioning behavior, the
literature reveal the importance of exploring the impact of institutions on sanction onset. I aim
to go beyond their limited scope on PTAs, and focus on security and economic institutions that
are relevant to sanction episodes, to find out whether they facilitate or pacify the sanctioning
behavior of their member states.
What Do We Know about The Impact of IGOs in Bilateral Relations?
The interest in intergovernmental organizations has a longer history in the field of interna-
tional relations than the interest in sanctions. The role of IGOs in international relations has
been subject to contentious debates within the field and the traditional paradigms offer clashing
interpretations.2 However, there is no doubt that IGOs are influential actors in international
relations that attract significant scholarly attention.
One of the main focuses of the more recent literature on IGO influence in bilateral state
relations is the question of whether or not IGOs promote peace. Oneal and Russett (2001) find
that joint institutional membership decreases the probability of militarized interstate dispute
initiation. Studies that follow them try to specify the characteristics of IGOs that are influential
on this decision. Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) and Bearce and Bondanella (2007)
find that only highly institutionalized IGOs and IGOs with cohesive member state preferences
are capable of having a pacifying impact on dispute initiation decisions; whereas Pevehouse
and Russett (2009) argue that densely democratic IGOs are far more likely to foster peaceful
relations among members. Haftel and Thompson (2006) attempt to differentiate IGOs based
2See Martin and Simmons (1998) for a detailed examination of the earlier literature on IGOs.
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on their level of independence from states and Leskiw (2002) differentiates between IGOs that
are regional and global in scale. He finds that regional organizations perform much better in
pacifying states than global organizations.
The literature is very rich and diverse in terms of the paths chosen to differentiate between
IGOs. A single measure to account for the variation among IGOs does not exist, however there
has been a consensus in the literature that IGOs are not equal and each study has to account
for this variation. This is also the path that I choose in this paper. I start with the assumption
that equating IGOs is likely to generate misleading results. Therefore, I analyze IGOs based on
their relevancy to a given sanction episode, and by matching the issue under contention in the
sanction episode with the primary mandate of the institution.
The focus of the IGO literature is not only on militarized conflict initiation, but also on the
influence of IGOs on the duration of disputes (Shannon, Morey and Boehmke 2010), settlement
of disputes (Shannon 2009) as well as the likelihood of compliance with negotiated settlements
(Mitchell and Hensel 2007). However; to my knowledge, there has been no scholarly work done
in the area of IGO influence on the decision of states to threaten another state with sanctions or
their imposition. This study aims to fill this gap.
What Do We Know About Sanctions?
Economic sanctions are often characterized as imperfect substitutes for military action and
ruled by similar dynamics as war (Drezner 1999; Marinov 2003). They are often designed to
alter targets’ behavior through inflicting economic harm or signal discontent. The literature on
sanctions mainly focus on three aspects of sanctions: its initiation, duration3 and effectiveness.4
Here, I will explicitly focus on the literature on sanction onset and how to explore the decision
to impose sanctions given the level of connectedness between the sender and the target through
shared IGO memberships. Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2008) suggest that “to the extent
that international institutions are believed to matter for economic sanctions, they are important
3See Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000) and McGillivray and Stam (2004) for the duration literature.
4See Dashti-Gibson, Davis and Radcliff (2007); Allen (2005); Early (2011) and Bapat et al. (2013) for the sanction
effectiveness literature.
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in determining success rather than onset under conditions of multilateralism.” Contrary to their
claim, I aim to show that IGO involvement is equally influential in the decision of the senders
to initiate sanction episodes as a foreign policy tool.
The early literature on sanctions had often been criticized because of its failure to account
for the threat stage of sanctions. Scholars have identified the selection bias problem associated
with this failure (Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004; Whang, Mclean and Kuberski 2013).
Treating threats as an integral part of the interaction between the sender and the target is a
remedy for this problem. Similar to the sanction onset literature, the literature on the threats of
sanctions primarily focus on the effectiveness of threats and try to uncover the conditions under
which the target is more likely to comply with the demands of the sender before sanctions
are imposed (Whang, Mclean and Kuberski 2013). Some argue that economic coersion is more
likely to succeed at the threat stage (Eaton and Engers 1992; Smith 1996); whereas others argue
that some types of impositions are likely to succeed than threats (Krustev 2010). What received
relatively less attention is the factors that facilitate threats. In this paper, I will account for the
threat stage of sanctions and try to uncover the role of IGOs as an intermediary between the
sender and the target at the threat stage.
The literature at the imposition stage is more extensive than the threat stage. There are
substantial findings about the factors that makes a sanction imposition more or less likely. For
instance, findings prove that democracies are less likely to sanction each other (Lektzian and
Souva 2003; Cox and Drury 2006). The literature relating regime type and domestic institutions
to sanction onset concludes that the democratic peace theory holds not only for militarized inter-
state disputes, but also for lower intensity conflicts, such as economic sanctions. It has also been
well-established that democracies resort to sanctions more frequently than non-democracies.
Wallace (2013) extends this literature by differentiating sanctions based on the issue under
contention and finds that the pacifying effects of joint democracy only operate for security
related sanctions, while in other matters, such as trade disputes, democratic constraints do
not have such an impact. Just like it is reductionist to assume that all IGOs are equal, it is
highly reductionist to assume that all sanctions are governed by same dynamics. Wallace (2013)
rightly suggests that “a singular logic for the determinants of economic coersion may not exist,
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but rather the effect of factors may depend on the particular issues under dispute.” Following
this logic, I will analyze the sanctions separately based on the issues under contention and try
to uncover if IGO influence works the same way in different sanction cases.
It is evident that sanctions do not only hurt the target, but the sender. Therefore, the extent
to which the sender is capable of tolerating the losses associated with the sanctions is central
to the sanction onset literature (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2008). High levels of trade
dependence between the sender and the target raises costs of sanctions for both actors and
thus the likelihood of sanction onset decreases. I propose joint institutional membership as
a mechanism through which this process works, given the fact that institutional membership
increases trade gains and dependencies.
The literature also goes beyond conceptualizing sanctions as disputes between the govern-
ments. Sanctions also affect the firms and the individuals in the sender and the target (Morgan
and Schwebach 1996; Morgan and Bapat 2003). There are a substantial amount of scholarly
work focusing on domestic actors and their impacts on the decision to impose sanctions as well
as the effectiveness of them, which is promising for the field.
Despite the increasing scholarly attention on sanctions, the impact of IGOs and the ways
they influence bilateral relations remain a substantially under-researched area. Bapat et al.
(2013) conclude that empirical patterns uncovered by the sanctions literature have not been
theoretically well understood. The literature on sanction onset does an impressive job in iden-
tifying factors that increases the likelihood of sanction imposition; however, the mechanisms
through which these factors influence sanctioning behavior is insufficiently addressed. This
study attempts to theorize and empirically get at the mechanisms through which IGOs influ-
ence the decision to initiate a sanction episode; however, the need for further theorizing and
empirical effort is evident. The next section outlines the theory of this study linking IGO in-
volvement and sanctioning behavior.
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Theory: Intergovernmental Organizations and Sanctions
How do intergovernmental organizations influence the sanctioning behavior of the partici-
pating states? Does the involvement of IGOs have a pacifying effect on the participants sanc-
tioning behavior or does it facilitate sanctions? What are the mechanisms through which IGOs
influence decision making prior to sanction episodes? I will answer these questions by focus-
ing on the threat and imposition stage of sanctions separately.5 I argue that at the threat stage
IGOs serve as an intermediary channel through which the threats are sent and connectedness
through IGOs facilitates threats of sanctions. I propose the opposite mechanism for the imposi-
tion stage. I expect to see that IGOs pacify the sanctioning behavior and lower the probability
of economic coercion as a foreign policy tool.
The second pillar of the theory linking IGOs and sanctions is to take the way different IGOs
work on different types of sanctions into consideration. I focus on the relevance of IGOs to
a given sanction episode to understand the extent to which they are influential in sanctioning
behavior. Differentiating between IGOs based on their mandates, and differentiating sanctions
based on their issue under contention are steps at the right direction to capture the dynamic
relationship between IGOs and sanction episodes.
Sanction Threats and IGOs
Without incorporating the prior stage of sanction threats into our theories and empirical
analysis, we cannot capture the sanctioning behavior of states in a comprehensive manner.
Focusing only on imposed sanctions and leaving threats of sanctions out of analysis are likely
to cause selection bias (Nooruddin 2002), which may be preventing the current literature from
evaluating the determinants of sanctions and their effectiveness (Bapat et al. 2013). Many recent
theories acknowledge this problem and suggest that threats are an integral part of sanction
episodes, and a focus on threats together with imposition is a remedy for the selection bias
5The need for evaluating the threats and impositions as a part of the same strategic interaction between the sender
and the target is essential. The mechanisms between the two stages, the conditions under which threats are
likely to be followed through or fail and the conditions under which the threat stage is bypassed are left to future
projects.
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problem (Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004; Krustev 2010).
Sanctions are costly both for the sender and the target; thus the impositions of sanctions
are not desirable for the sender if there is a less costly option. Threats of sanctions are in fact
a less costly option to demand policy concessions from the target. Understanding the causal
mechanisms behind the decision to send threats of sanctions is essential in understanding the
effectiveness of threats as well as the reasons why states proceed to the imposition stage. I argue
that states with high levels of interconnectedness through IGOs are more likely to threaten one
another with sanctions.
First of all, threats of sanctions can be conceptualized as a source of information and a sig-
nal about the likelihood of sanction imposition. IGOs can serve as a channel through which
this information is conveyed and the signal is sent. If the sender shares a high number of joint
memberships with the target, the signal sent by the sanction threat is more likely to be credible.
Sanction threats increase the target’s belief that the sender will impose sanctions if they do not
comply with the demands, if the threat is considered as credible by the target. The signaling
literature has established that threats need to be costly in order to be credible (Fearon 1997).
However, the costliness of threat of sanctions, thus the credibility of it is questionable.6 The
targets may not change their behavior when they face with a sanction threat, simply because
they may not learn additional information about the consequences of non-compliance. How-
ever, when the threats are publicized through the channels of IGOs, it is more likely that the
target will update beliefs on the likelihood of a sanction imposition if they do not comply. Thus,
I argue that IGOs serve as an arbiter of credibility at the threat stage of sanctions.
Secondly, the audience of sanction threats is not only the target, but the other member
states of the IGOs. When a threat is made and not followed through, a reputational cost is
attached to backing down. Such a behavior has an impact on the credibility of future threats of
sanctions made to different targets, as well. When we introduce the reputational costs attached
to incredible sanction threats, we can conceptualize sanction threats as costly signals and argue
6Some threats are more specific than the others and the less specific threats tend to be less credible. Moreover,
some threats are initiated by verbal statements by government officials, whereas the others are initiated by the
passage of a conditional law specifying the consequences of non-compliance by the target. The variation among
the credibility of threats is an interesting dynamic to explore in future projects.
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that IGOs help the senders to generate reputational costs that contribute to the effectiveness
of sanction threats. If the targets expectation about the effectiveness of threats is high, threats
become a more viable option. In other words, high numbers of joint IGO memberships between
the sender and the target help the sender to send more credible threats to the target, therefore
threats become a desirable way to push the target to make policy concessions.
Furthermore, other member states can help the sender to exert pressure on the target through
making threats complementing the threat of the sender, or they can create issue linkages to
exert pressure on the target. Cooperation at the threat stage can be facilitated through IGOs
which in return increases the expectations of the sender about the effectiveness of sanction
threats. Slantchev (2003) argues that the power to hurt through economic coercion helps states
to succeed at the threat level and this power often comes from the sender’s ability to turn a
unilateral action into a multilateral one, which is easier to achieve through IGOs.
The third audience of the sanction threats is the IGO itself. Once a threat is made, the
issue under contention is also brought to the attention of the international institutions that both
the sender and the target belong to. Threat of sanctions is also a signal to the international
institutions suggesting that they have to address the issue through their enforcement and dispute
settlement mechanisms before a sanction is imposed. Given the costs attached to sanctions,
senders prefer to change the policy of the target through less costly ways, and dispute settlement
mechanisms offer an alternative route to exert pressure on the target, which makes threats a
more desirable policy option for the sender. Moreover, if the IGO concludes that the target is
not cooperating by the rules and norms of the institution, they can strengthen the threat of the
sender by backing the decision of sanction imposition if the policy concessions are not made
by the target. The possibility of being backed up by an IGO and receiving a stamp of approval
from an institutions are also among the reasons why senders may prefer to threaten targets with
sanctions, when they belong to the same set of institutions.
Lastly, being highly interconnected through IGOs prevents senders to resort to more con-
tentious means to solve conflicts and making threats of sanctions can be the highest level of
tension that they are willing to experience with the target. High numbers of joint member-
ship implies higher levels of interdependencies between the sender and the target (Boehmer
9
and Nordstrom 2008); thus the target can refrain from imposing sanctions to the other member
states of the IGOs that they belong to. Under those circumstances, threat of sanctions becomes
a viable policy option for the sender that is dissatisfied by the certain policies of the target.
Interestingly, not all sanctions aim to change target’s behavior or assume that it will suc-
ceed. Sometimes governments use sanctions for reputational purposes and to signal discontent
(Lektzian and Sprecher 2007). In a lot of cases, the audience of the threats is not the target, but
the domestic audiences of the sender (Smith 1998; Whang 2011). As a matter of fact, not all
states want to incur the costs of sanctions and they send threats with no intention of following
through on them. Under those circumstances, threats are often a viable and less costly alterna-
tive for the sender. It is hard to differentiate threats based on the motivations behind making
them; therefore I assume that the sender aims to change the policies of the target to a certain
extent.
This theoretical discussion linking threats of sanctions to intergovernmental organization
leads to the first testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 - Threat Stage: As the number of joint membership in IGOs in-
creases, the probability that the sender will threaten the target with sanctions in-
creases.
Sanction Imposition and IGOs
Sanctions are imposed if the target fails to comply at the threat stage. There are also a
substantial amount of sanction impositions that is not preceded by sanction threats.7 In this
paper I do not differentiate between the sanctions following a threat and the sanctions imposed
without a threat, however I acknowledge that it is an interesting dynamic to explore. Here, I will
focus on the mechanisms through which IGOs influence states’ decisions to impose sanctions.
Following Mitchell and Hensel (2007), I argue that IGOs influence sanctioning behavior of
states both passively and actively. Passive involvement of IGOs refers to the joint membership
7There are 377 sanctions from the years 1945-2000 that is preceded by threats; whereas there are 244 sanctions
that are not preceded by threats. The number of threats that are not followed through is 293.
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of states in regional or global IGOs and accounts for one of the legs of the Kantian tripod of
peace; democracy and economic interdependence being the other two (Russett, Oneal and Davis
1998). Providing credible information and transparency, reducing transaction costs, facilitating
cooperation, communication, as well as norm and interest convergence and lengthening shadow
of future are among the passive roles of IGOs in bilateral relations. Active involvement of IGOs,
on the other hand, refers to the cases in which IGOs actively shape state behavior through
enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms.
Passive Involvement of IGOs Prior to Sanction Episodes
Sanctions are often conceptualized as lower intensity conflicts falling between diplomacy
and militarized disputes and often resembles low-intensity militarized disputes (Lektzian and
Sprecher 2007). Similar to the logic of militarized disputes, economic sanctions can also be
seen as a manifestation of bargaining problems, where the informational asymmetries are at the
core (Fearon 1995). IGOs play a crucial role in mitigating bargaining problems by providing
credible information to the sides of the conflict. I assume that sanctions would not be imposed
and conflicts would be solved latest at the threat stage if the sides of the conflict had complete
information about the behavior and consequences of their policy choices.
IGOs provide transparency regarding the preferences and behaviors of participating states,
as well as the consequences of their foreign policy actions (Keohane 1984; Thompson 2006).
For instance, the sender is uncertain about whether the sanction will be effective in extracting
policy concessions from the target or not. The target can ignore the sanction, reciprocate it
or escalate it with issue linkages. The sender is also not aware of the response that they will
receive from other potential interested countries. It can be the case that the sanction will be
reciprocated not just by the target, but by a group of other countries with ties to the target. More
importantly, the sender is not certain about whether or not the same desired policy concession
can be extracted by a less costly way than sanction imposition. (Smith 1996; Lacy and Niou
2004; Whang, Mclean and Kuberski 2013)
The target, on the other hand, is uncertain as to whether the domestic firms of the sender
will comply with the sanctioning decision, whether the sender can maintain cooperation of
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other states, and how long will the sanction be in place. Sanction effectiveness is higher when
domestic firms comply with the sanction (Morgan and Bapat 2003) and when the sanctions
can attract multilateral cooperation (Bapat and Morgan 2009). In the absence of those pieces
of information, the effectiveness of sanctions is harder to predict. Under those circumstances
sanction impositions often seems like a viable option. One explanation to the puzzle of why
states resort to sanctions despite its ineffectiveness can be the lack of information prior to
sanction imposition.
Passive involvement of IGOs informs both the sender and the target about the preferences
of their opponents, reactions and future behaviors of third parties as well as the potential out-
come of the sanctions. This information is often transparently conveyed through the formal
and informal channels of communication and consultation that IGOs provide to its members.
Routinized interactions and trust built through those interactions facilitate information flows
among members and have a pacifying effect through greater understanding of and more credi-
ble information about others’ policy positions, intentions and preferences (Bearce 2005; Volgy,
Grant and Rodgers 2008).
Secondly, IGOs lengthen the shadow of future and increase dependencies among member
states. For instances IGOs with an economic mandate increase trade among members and dis-
courage actions that may impose damages on this relationship. One of the reasons why states
become members of IGOs in the first place is their expectation of substantial gains from the
interdependencies created by IGOs (Boehmer and Nordstrom 2008). Therefore, impositions
of sanctions has costly opportunity costs for the sender (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000). The
same logic applies to the target, because targets refrain from engaging in non-cooperative be-
havior that may risk being sanctioned and losing the benefits of interdependencies.
Lastly, shared institutions passively create social environments that promote cooperation,
communication and propagate norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Johnston 2001). States
that perceive themselves as a part of the same in-group may refrain from imposing sanctions to
each other. Furthermore, the information provided from an in-group deemed to be more reliable
(Mercer 2005). IGOs are the primary social structures for states in the international system
(Wendt 1994) and they facilitate member-state interest convergence through the mechanisms of
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socialization (Bearce and Bondanella 2007). Furthermore IGOs cause convergence in domestic
politics, either by coercing states to adopt certain policies or through emulation (Cao 2009). It
is true that states with similar interests create and join IGOs in the first place (Oneal and Russett
2001), there is also evidence to demonstrate that IGOs promote similarities and convergences
among member states (Mitchell and Hensel 2007).
Through the mechanisms discussed in detail above, IGOs encourage member states to co-
operate with one another and shy states away from sanctioning each other. The increased levels
of information, shared norms and interests and expectations about the future can eradicate the
need and incentive to impose sanctions in many conflictual cases. Thus, passive involvement
of IGOs can be a remedy for the bargaining problems that is assumed to lead to sanction impo-
sition and pacify sanctioning behavior.
Active Involvement of IGOs Prior to Sanction Episodes
Although the passive involvement of IGOs through joint membership is expected to in-
fluence member states decision-making on sanctions; the theory will be lacking without ac-
counting for active involvement of IGOs. Active involvement of IGOs generates information
instead of passively facilitating it. I conceptualize active involvement as the rulings of IGOs
through dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms. Only well-institutionalized organiza-
tions capable of being actively involved in bilateral relationships of participating members have
a pacifying effect on militarized interstate disputes (Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom 2004).
A similar dynamic should be expected to be in place for economic sanctions and IGOs that
are capable of being actively involved in bilateral decision-making are the likely candidates of
pacifiers of sanctioning behavior.
The active involvement of IGOs works through two separate but related mechanisms. First,
IGOs deter member states from engaging in behavior that is likely to trigger a sanction episode.
They simply do so by facilitating interdependencies among member states, as well as raising
the costs of defection. Secondly, once a conflict arises, IGOs settle disputes among members
that would otherwise lead to sanctions.
IGOs with effective dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms often act based on
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the norms of reciprocity (Keohane 1986; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Dorussen and Ward
2008). Behaviors violating institutional rules and norms have a possibility of being punished
by the dispute settlement mechanisms and retaliatory actions against such a defection can be
allowed and legitimized by the organization. In addition to the threat of being reciprocated,
dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms pose threats of imposing multilateral or in-
stitutional sanctions as a way of punishing defection (Shannon, Morey and Boehmke 2010).
Sanctions imposed and backed up by intergovernmental organizations are more likely to be
effective and successful in changing the policies of the target (Bapat and Morgan 2009). There-
fore, such sanctions can qualify as the worst case scenarios for the potential targets. Thus,
IGOs deter states from engaging in non-cooperative behavior, which in return decreases the
likelihood of sanction impositions. The threat of appealing to the dispute settlement mecha-
nisms of an international institutions can be evaluated as a part of the bargaining process (Fang
2010) and acts as a strong deterrence mechanism for the potential targets of sanctions.
However, those mechanisms are not always effective in assuring cooperation. There are
many instances in which states depart from the rules of the game set by international insti-
tutions, despite the potential retaliatory consequences. However, even in such cases where
IGO deterrence is not effective, IGOs preserve their active pacifying role in bilateral relations.
Sanctions are imposed when there are no other ways to solve the disputes. IGOs offer states
an alternative and often less costly way to solve bilateral conflicts through dispute settlement
mechanisms.
Institutionalization of IGOs through legalization and judicialization is likely to contribute to
the effectiveness of dispute settlement mechanisms and the pacifying effect of IGOs (Keohane,
Moravscik and Slaughter 2000). If states trust that the IGO is capable of solving the dispute,
states might be willing to choose the dispute settlement route, rather than the sanctions route. As
the effectiveness of enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms increase, the information
on the consequences of defection will be more clear and credible. This will in return decrease
the need for unilateral action to counteract the defection. IGOs that fail to institutionalize the
mechanisms of early resolution of conflicts are likely to fail in pacify sanctioning behavior.
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The transformation of the GATT into the WTO is a good illustrative case of the institution-
alization of IGOs and how it contributes to the pacification of sanctioning behavior among the
member states. Following the Uruguay Round in 1994, the WTO dispute settlement procedures
became better integrated, more precise and efficient (Kim 2008; Zangl 2008). Such a transfor-
mation provided an effective way for states to solve their trade-related disputes, without having
the need to resort to sanctions. It is true that initiating dispute settlement in the WTO is also a
costly and a time-consuming process (Sevilla 1999); however, such costs can be preferable to
the costs attached to sanctions. The sharp decrease in the frequency of trade-related sanctions
in 19958 can be due to the effectiveness of the dispute settlement mechanisms and the ability of
the WTO to offer an alternative solution to the conflictual cases.
Lastly, many IGOs have rules that prohibit sanctions, unless they are authorized by the
international organization itself. For instance, the WTO formally restricts members from sanc-
tioning other members except in some cases, defined by Article 20 or for some security reasons
detailed in Article 21. However, this mechanism is not as strong as the first two mechanisms
through which IGOs are actively involved in bilateral relations; because according to the char-
ters of many institutions, the majority of the imposed sanctions are illegal.
Passive and active involvement of IGOs work together to influence states’ sanctioning be-
havior. They are not mutually exclusive, but they complement one another. IGO involvement
encourages cooperation among members, deters non-cooperative behavior and solves disputes
that would otherwise lead to sanctions. The theoretical discussion above leads to the second
testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 - Imposition Stage: Highly interconnected dyads through shared
membership in intergovernmental organizations are less likely to experience sanc-
tion impositions compared to dyads that are less interconnected.
8The frequency of sanctions has increased again in the early 2000s. The overall increase is mostly driven by the
increase of security related sanctions, rather than trade-related sanctions. These patterns require further theoretical
and empirical attention.
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Accounting for the Variation Among IGOs and Sanctions
It is an over-simplification to assume that the theoretical discussion presented above holds
for each and every IGO. It should be acknowledged that there are some IGOs that are able to
encourage cooperation, deter defection, provide information and settle disputes; whereas there
are some IGOs that fail to influence state decisions and bilateral relations. In order to test the
theory on the pacifying effect of IGOs in sanctioning behavior, we have to account for the
variation among IGOs and take their capabilities into consideration.
There are a multiple ways that we can classify IGOs and measure the extent to which they
are capable of influencing state decisions. Here, I aim to answer the question of whether IGOs
pacify sanctioning behavior or facilitate it; therefore I evaluate IGOs based on how relevant they
are to a given sanction case. IGO effectiveness is confined by their mandates and it is wrong
to assume that they have a pacifying effect on sanctions, where the issue under contention is
beyond their mandates. For instance, NATO is an intergovernmental military organization as a
system of collective defense and it may not necessarily be influential in a decision about sanc-
tions on a trade dispute between its members. It’s enforcement mechanisms cannot solve trade
disputes or the organization cannot require states to share information on their trade practices
and preferences. Similarly, NAFTA, as a trade institution may not be able to facilitate infor-
mation flow on military preferences and future behaviors of its member states on a military
realm. Therefore, we can only come to conclusions about the effectiveness of IGOs in paci-
fying sanctioning behavior, if we match the IGOs with the sanctions, where the issue under
contention is relevant to their area of expertise. It would be wrong to conclude that NATO
fails to pacify sanctioning behavior of its members; just because it cannot solve the bargaining
problems between the member states on trade matters.
Following this logic, I expect to find that joint membership in trade institutions are more
likely to have a pacifying effect on trade related sanctions and not on other types of sanc-
tions. Similarly, security-mandated IGOs are more likely to have a pacifying effect on sanction
episodes, where the issue under contention is security related. Not being able to pacify sanction-
ing behavior on trade disputes does not make a security IGO an ineffective one and similarly,
not being able to deter a sanction where the issue under contention is security related does not
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imply that an economic IGO fails to pacify sanctioning behavior.
Differentiating the types of IGOs based on their mandate as well as sanction episodes based
on the issue under contention help to refine the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2(a): As the number of joint membership in IGOs with an economic
mandate increases within a dyad, the probability of the onset of trade-related sanc-
tions decreases.
Hypothesis 2(b): As the number of joint membership in IGOs with a security man-
date increases within a dyad, the probability of the onset of security-related sanc-
tions decreases.
Hypothesis 2(c): IGOs have no effect on sanctions beyond their mandates.
The next section will outline the data and the methodological choices made to test the
hypotheses.
Data and Research Design
The unit of analysis is the directed-dyad-year9 for the years 1950-200010, with all dyads
consisting of two states meeting the criteria for membership in the international system as
defined by the Correlates of War (COW) project. The first country represents the sender and
the second country represents the target of sanctions.
Dependent Variables
I use several different dependent variables to test my hypotheses. All of them are coded
using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Data11 Version 4.0 (Morgan, Bapat and
9I used Eugene Version 3.204 to generate my sample (Scott and Stam 2000).
10Sanctions and IGO data are also available for the years 1945 to 1950 and 2000 to 2005, however, the availability
of data on other variables in the model limited the temporal domain of this study.
11Sanctions are defined as actions that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a
target country in an effort to persuade that country to change one or more of its policies.
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Krustev 2009). It is the most complete account for sanction onset and the only dataset available
that identifies the threat stage of economic sanctions. Furthermore, the data identifies the is-
sue(s) involved in the sanction episodes, which allows me to differentiate sanctioning behavior
based on the issue under contention. Sanction episodes is identified by the dataset as all identi-
fied sanction cases which are assumed to begin when the sender either makes a threat about the
possibility of sanctions or imposes sanctions with no previous threat.
Before the TIES Dataset became available, the literature on sanctions had been heavily re-
lied on Haufbauer et al. (2009)’s data (HSEO), which is highly focused on high profile sanction
episodes where the issue under contention is mostly security related and the United States is
a unique sender (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi 2014). The replications of findings based on
HSEO data using the TIES data reveal that several findings no longer hold (Bapat and Morgan
2009; Wallace 2013). Unlike HSEO, TIES data provides a wide a range of sanction episodes,
which enables researchers to reach conclusions closer to the true sanctioning process.
To test the first hypothesis, I code sanction threats as the dependent variable. It is coded as
1 if there is a sanction threat and 0 otherwise. I exclude the threat cases where the sender or
the target of the sanction threats was an international organization. I also coded security related
threats and trade related threats, to be able to conduct robustness checks that accounts for the
variation among threats and to achieve comparability with the models testing the extensions of
the second hypothesis.
The second hypothesis on the relation between sanction onsets and joint IGO membership
is tested by using sanction imposition as the dependent variable which is coded as 1 for the first
year of sanction imposition, and 0 otherwise. I made this coding decision, because I am solely
interested in the decision to impose a sanction. However, it can also be rightly argued that
whether or not there is an ongoing sanction between the sender and the target will have a direct
impact on the decision to impose further sanctions or not.12 Fortunately, most of the sanctions
are short lived13, which mitigates the extent to which this decision may introduce bias to the
12I will extend my analysis in the paper by either adding a dummy variable to the models indicating whether or not
there is an ongoing sanction imposed by the sender on the target or by dropping all those overlapping sanctions
out of analysis.
13Almost half of the sanction cases end within one year and 75% of the cases terminate in less than three years
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results. I also exclude sanction episodes where the sender or the target of the sanctions was an
international organization, because the focus of this study is not on the sanctioning behavior of
international organizations, but on their impact on the unilateral state decisions about sanctions.
In order to test the extensions of the second hypothesis based on the issue under contention,
I code security sanctions as 1 if they are security-related and 0 if the issue is economic or trade-
related. Similarly, I code economic sanctions as 1 if they are trade-related and 0 otherwise. I
test H2(a) and H2(b) by using security-related sanction onsets and trade-related sanction onsets
as the dependent variables, respectively. For H2(c), I use the dependent variable that does not
differentiate between the types of sanctions based on the issue under contention.
I code a sanction as security-related if the issue under contention is one of the following:
containing political influence, containing military behavior, destabilizing the regime, releasing
citizens, property or material, solving territorial disputes, denying strategic material, retaliating
for an alliance or alignment choice, improving human rights, ending weapons/materials pro-
liferation or terminating support for non-state actors. Sanctions are coded as economy-related
related if the issue under contention is related to drug trafficking, environmental policies, trade
policies or implementation of economic reforms.
Usually there are multiple issues involved in a single sanction case. If a sanction is imposed
to solve both security and non-security related issues, I allowed both security and economy-
related sanction onset to be coded as 1. Issues of some sanctions are coded as ’other’ in the
TIES Dataset and the issue is described. In those cases I code the issue under contention based
on my judgment. 14
(Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi 2014).
14For instance the issue of the US sanction on Peru in 1967 is identified as the purchase of jet bombers, thus
it is coded as a security-related sanction. Whereas, the sanction imposed by the German Federal Republic on
German Democratic Republic in 1965 due to East Germany’s mandatory currency exchange policy against West
Berliners is coded as an economy-related sanction.
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TABLE 1: The Frequency of Threats and Sanctions - Issue under Contention
Security Economic Total
Threat 288 407 670
Imposition 288 352 621
Table 1 shows that in the majority of sanction episodes the issue under contention is eco-
nomic or trade-related. It also demonstrates that threats are an integral part of sanction episodes;
in fact, threats have a higher frequency than the impositions. Assuming that all sanctions are
the same will be a mistake and differentiating them by the issue under contention will help us
to have a better and a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of sanctions.
Explanatory Variables
To measure the main explanatory variable of the first two hypotheses, I need a variable to
capture the extent to which states share membership in IGOs. Joint Membership is a count of
all IGOs to which both states in the dyad belong to. This measure is constructed by using The
Correlates of War Intergovernmental Organization Data, version 2.1 (Pevehouse, Nordstrom
and Warnke 2004). The dataset records membership in IGOs in five years period for the years
before 1965. Following recent studies using this variable as an explanatory variable, I use
linear interpolation between observed values of each dyad to fill in membership information in
missing years.
Counting the number of IGOs that two states belong to is the most common approach in the
literature to measure the extent of joint membership. (Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom 2004;
Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Shannon, Morey and Boehmke 2010) However, it is also evident
that it is a crude measure, which equates all IGOs. Therefore, as a robustness check, I coded the
ratio of the count of the joint membership of states in IGOs to the total number of IGOs that the
sender belongs to. This measure goes beyond a simple count and accounts for the importance
of the interconnectedness within a dyad relative to the sender’s centrality in the international
system. The results remain substantively the same, therefore I only report the results using the
first measure of joint membership.
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The extensions of the second hypothesis aim to have a more nuanced approach to IGOs,
in line with the distinction that I made for sanctions based on the issue under contention. The
IGO Dataset of Correlates of War (version 2.1) identifies 495 IGOs; however, arguing that all of
them facilitate cooperation, provide information or settle disputes are not realistic. For instance,
the influence of the North American Plant Protection Organization is likely to be negligible
compared to the influence of the North American Free Trade Agreement in any given sanction
case. First, I leave all IGOs that are not likely to have an impact on the decision to make
sanction threats or impose them out of the analysis. Second, I divide the relevant IGOs into
two groups based on their primary mandates: IGOs with a security mandate and IGOs with an
economic mandate. The main explanatory variables for H2(a) and H2(b) are joint membership
in security organizations and joint membership in economic organizations, respectively. The
aim of this differentiation is to acknowledge that organizations with different mandates and
raison d’etre are likely to vary in their abilities to influence states’ sanctioning behavior. The
theory predicts that IGOs are only influential on sanction cases that are within the boundaries
of their mandate.
I code the variable Joint Membership-Security as a count of all security IGOs to which both
states in the dyad belong to. I identified 19 IGOs with an explicit security mandate.15 Similarly,
I have identified IGOs with an explicit economic mandate to code Joint Membership-Economic
variable as a count of all economic IGOs to which both states in the dyad belong to.16 Boehmer,
Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) code all IGOs with a security mandate until 1992. Ingram,
Robinson and Busch (2005) also has a data set that differentiates IGOs based on their functions.
I consulted to both datasets and their procedures of identifying IGO mandates.
15The list of security organizations can be found in the appendix.
16I also conducted a robustness check by operationalizing these two variables as the ratio of the count of the joint
membership of states in IGOs to the total number of IGOs that the sender belongs to, for both security and
economic IGOs respectively. The results do not change substantially.
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TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Main Explanatory Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Joint Membership 21.467 11.389 0 107
Joint Membership - Security 0.209 0.485 0 5
Joint Membership - Economic 4.844 3.44 0 30
Table 2 helps us to have a closer look at the main explanatory variables. The dyad with
the highest level of connectedness through security IGOs share membership in five security
IGOs.17 Overall, the total number of economic IGOs is significantly higher than the number of
security IGOs, and the dyad with the highest economic interconnectedness through economic
IGOs share 30 memberships.18
I acknowledge that differentiating of IGOs based on their mandate is not satisfactory enough
to account for the variation in IGOs and the extent to which they influence sanctioning behavior
of their members. However, there is no commonly accepted way to account for such a variation.
Nierop (1994) rightly claims that “designing a simple, unambiguous, and satisfactory classifi-
cation of IGOs as to ‘political weight’ or strength of political link proves virtually impossible.”
I agree with him and think that every study has to come up with theories to differentiate IGOs
based on the phenomenon that they are interested in exploring. In this paper, the most plausible
way to do so is to match the IGOs with the sanctions based on the relevancy criteria discussed
above.
Control Variables
In addition to states’ connectedness to one another through IGOs, I expect other factors to
influence the decision to impose sanctions. Therefore, I control for variables that are expected
to influence the sanctioning behavior. A number of studies indicate that states with higher GDP
are more likely to impose sanctions, and more so if they are relatively wealthier than their
targets (Cox and Drury 2006). The relative economic power within the dyad is measured by the
17France and Italy from 1993 to 2000.
18Sweden and Denmark from 1996 to 1999.
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ratio of GDP in current-year US dollars between the sender and the target, taken from Gleditsch
(2002). As relative economic power increases in favor of the sender, the costs of sanctions on
the sender becomes more tolerable, therefore the sign of this variable is expected to be positive.
Most of the studies on sanctions using Gleditsch’s data measure relative economic power
through the ratio of GDP per capita between the sender and the target, however, the results can
be misleading due to the outliers such as China or India; which are relatively common states in
the dataset either as a sender or a target.19 Therefore, I preferred to use relative GDP instead of
using relative GDP per capita.
Trade measures the senders total trade in constant 2000 dollars, taken from Oneal and Rus-
sett (2001). The majority of studies use a trade variable measured by the total trade divided
by the GDP of the sender, taken from Gleditsch (2002); however including this measure along
with a different measure of relative GDP in the model is problematic. The relative size of
the economy is accounted by Relative GDP variable and it is redundant to measure trade as a
percentage of the sender’s GDP. It is argued that high levels of trade reduce the incentive to
impose sanctions. When senders have more to lose from sanctions, it becomes more costly and
less desirable to impose sanctions. However, it can also be rightly argued that high volumes of
trade imply a highly interconnected dyad that may experience more sanctions than a dyad with
no trade ties, because the latter simply has a lower probability to disagree over trade matters.
I also include Foreign Policy Similarity into models, assuming that the states with similar
foreign policy preferences are less likely to sanction each other. To operationalize this variable I
use the S-score adapted from the Affinity of Nations Index (Gartzke 2006), which is assembled
from UN General Assembly votes. I omit a commonly used alliance measure from the analysis,
assuming that it has an overlap with the foreign policy similarity variable.
Regime type is also an important determinant of sanction imposition. It has been commonly
argued that democracies are more likely to use sanctions as a foreign policy tool (Kaempfer and
Lowenberg 1992; Wallace 2013). In order to control for this finding, I operationalize regime
type using the Polity IV score, which ranges from -10 to +10, with higher values indicating a
19The number of sanctions imposed or threatened both by China and India is 26. China is the target of 28 sanction
impositions or threats and this number is 38 for India.
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greater level of democracy (Marshall and Gurr 2013). I code Democratic Sender as 1 if the
sender has a Polity score greater than or equal to 6 and 0 otherwise.20
Finally, I add a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the United States is the sender, and
0 if not. 256 of 621 sanctions in the years 1950-2000 had been imposed by the US. Similarly
the US had been the sender of the 352 sanction threats out of the total of 670. Controlling for
the US behavior will make sure that the results are not driven by the US sanctions only.
Methodology
The sanction literature has dominantly employed rare events logistic regression (King and
Zeng 2001), because using logistic regression with the data on sanction onset and sanction
threats as dependent variables assumed to underestimate the probability of them due to the
excessive number of 0s (indicating no sanction imposition or no threat of sanctions within a
dyad in a given year) and a very low frequency of 1s. Both models give very similar results,
except the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates. Therefore I will present logistic regression
results.21
Following Carter and Signorino (2010), I also include a variable counting the number of
years since the last economic sanction threat and imposition, its square and its cube for each
model.22 The data with a dichotomous dependent variable and temporal dependence are likely
to violate the independence assumption of ordinary logistic models. We should always be
cautious for temporarily related data and we cannot ignore the fact that the yearly observations
for a dyad are not independent from one another (Farber and Gowa 1997). If we fail to account
for the temporal dependence, it is highly likely that we will get wrong standard errors, which
will bias the results (Poirier and Ruud 1988).
Lastly, all independent variables are lagged one year to avoid simultaneity bias.
20As a robustness check I ran the models by using a polity score of 7 as a democracy cutoff, but the results did not
change substantially.
21Logistic regression will also allow me to report measures of fit such as Pseudo R2 and log-likelihood; however
such options are not available by default in rare events logistic regression package of Stata.
22As a robustness check, I included the time variable and three cubic splines following Beck, Katz and Tucker
(2013), using the btscs program for Stata. The results remain unchanged.
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Results
Results for H1: Threat Stage of Sanctions
TABLE 3: Logit: Threat of Sanctions, Joint Membership and Issue under Contention
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
DV Threat-All Threat-Security Threat-Trade
Joint Membership 0.028***
(0.00)
Joint Membership - Security -0.002
(0.11)
Joint Membership - Economic 0.087***
(0.02)
US 2.694*** 2.918*** 2.307***
(0.23) (0.34) (0.27)
Democratic Sender 1.017*** 0.492 1.918***
(0.29) (0.36) (0.58)
Foreign Policy Similarity -0.410*** -0.527*** -0.274*
(0.09) (0.16) (0.12)
Trade 0.372*** 0.370*** 0.468***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Relative GDP 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -9.715*** -9.142*** -11.036***
(0.29) (0.37) (0.57)
Number of Observations 359771 359771 359771
Pseudo R2 0.427 0.335 0.459
Log L -1839.6 -907.0 -1212.4
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Standard errors in parentheses.
t, t2, t3 are excluded from the table for simplicity
Table 3 presents the findings for the model testing the relationship between the level of
connectedness through IGOs and the probability of sanction threats. Model 1 does not account
for the variation among IGOs and threats. Model 2 focuses on the impact of security organiza-
tions on sanction threats, where the issue under contention is security related. Similarly, Model
3 accounts for the impact of trade-related institutions on the probability of sanction threats,
where the issue under contention is trade related. The last two models are not included to test
a hypothesis, but for comparability the models testing the extensions of the second hypothesis,
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presented in Table 4.
The empirical findings confirm the first hypothesis and suggest that as the number of joint
membership in a dyad increases, the likelihood of observing a sanction threat increases signif-
icantly, at the 0.001 level. It can be suggested that senders prefer to threaten other states with
sanctions that they share a high number of IGO memberships with, because they assume that
such a connectedness will make the threat more credible and increase the probability that the
threat will succeed.
The examination of the IGOs based on their relevancy to a given sanction threat reveals
an interesting mechanism. The results suggest that the theoretical framework conceptualizing
IGOs as a facilitator of the threat of sanctions hold only for IGOs with an economic mandate,
but not for security IGOs. The last two models in Table 3 suggest that the facilitating impact of
joint membership on the threat of sanctions works only for economic IGOs and security IGO
has no impact on the sanction threats, where the issue under contention is security related. The
analysis does not tell us whether security IGOs has a pacifying or a facilitating impact on the
decision to threaten other states with sanction on security issue. It is important to think about
the reasons why the results change when we match the IGOs with the threats that are relevant
to their mandates.
Results for H2 - Imposition Stage of Sanctions
Table 4 presents the results testing the second hypothesis and its extensions. More specif-
ically, Model 1 tests the relationship between joint membership on sanction impositions, by
neither disaggregating the sanction type nor the mandate of IGOs. Model 2 tests the impact
of interconnectedness through security IGOs on sanction episodes where the issue under con-
tention is security-related. Model 3 explores the relationship between shared membership in
economic IGOs and senders’ likelihood of imposing economy-related sanctions. Lastly, Model
4 presents the results of the model testing whether or not the impact of security IGOs is gener-
alizable to all types of sanctions.
The results of Model 1 provide strong support against my second hypothesis. I was expect-
ing to find that as the level of interconnectedness through IGO membership in a given dyad
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increases, the likelihood of sanction onset in that dyad decreases and states become less likely
to resort to sanctions to change their targets’ behavior. However, the empirical results of the
first model strongly suggest the otherwise. The main causal mechanism behind my expecta-
tion on the pacifying role of joint IGO membership is the passive and active involvement of
IGOs through information provision, deterrence of non-cooperative behavior and solving dis-
putes through dispute settlement mechanisms that would otherwise lead to sanctions. However,
the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate reveals that highly interconnected
dyads are indeed more likely to experience a sanction imposition.
Despite the lack of statistical support to my hypothesis, the causal mechanism that it is
based upon should not be disregarded completely. The data used to measure the variable Joint
Membership may not be a perfect measure to capture the extent to which states are intercon-
nected through shared IGO memberships. Correlates of War Intergovernmental Organizations
Dataset identifies 495 IGOs and most of the IGOs in the dataset are not necessarily related to
sanction cases. They are neither structured to facilitate information flow nor to solve disputes
among member states. Keeping those IGOs that have no capability to influence state decision
is likely to have an impact on the results of the model.
It may wrong to assume that institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcast-
ing Development or International Commission for Air Navigation are influential in bilateral
relations. They neither set requirements for their members to share information on the issues
relevant to sanctions, nor are capable of solving issues under contention. Allowing them to be
counted towards the measure of joint membership can generate misleading results. Therefore,
a more fine-grained sample of IGOs can be a better measure to capture the causal mechanisms
proposed by this study. That is indeed the motivation behind the second and the third model
presented in Table 4. The next step is to analyze the results of the models differentiating IGOs
based on their mandates and matching them with the relevant sanction cases.
Model 2 tests whether or not security institutions have a pacifying effect in security-related
sanction episodes, and the answer that the empirical analysis provides is yes. The negative and
statistically significant coefficient estimate implies that states that are highly connected through
institutions with an explicit security mandate are less likely to impose sanctions on one another
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for security-related issues. It also suggests that security institutions fulfill their reason d’etre,
perform well in providing information, solving bargaining problems and settling disputes in
security-related conflicts. Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) find that security IGOs
are more effective in promoting peace than those with non-security objectives and interests.
This study proves that their findings on the militarized interstate disputes also hold for sanction
impositions as an example of lower-intensity conflict.
TABLE 4: Logit: Joint Membership, Sanction Onset and Issue Under Contention
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
DV Sanction-All Sanction-Security Sanction-Trade Sanction-All
Joint Membership 0.015**
(0.00)
Joint Membership-Security -0.234* 0.068
(0.12) (0.08)
Joint Membership-Economic 0.056**
(0.02)
US 1.888*** 2.344*** 1.728*** 1.769***
(0.23) (0.36) (0.27) (0.24)
Democratic Sender 0.602** 0.485 0.720* 0.665**
(0.23) (0.29) (0.34) (0.23)
Foreign Policy Similarity -0.380** -0.540** -0.023 -0.337**
(0.13) (0.20) (0.16) (0.12)
Trade 0.438*** 0.398*** 0.522*** 0.493***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Relative GDP -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -8.501*** -8.701*** -9.290*** -8.355***
(0.26) (0.32) (0.41) (0.25)
Number of Observations 359771 359771 359771 359771
Pseudo R2 0.356 0.277 0.410 0.355
Log L -1951.3 -1008.3 -1164.7 -1955.5
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
t, t2, t3 are excluded from the table for simplicity.
Similar to the logic of Model 2, Model 3 tests the impact of the interconnectedness of states
through IGOs with an economic mandate on sanctions, where the issue under contention is
economic or trade-related. IGOs with trade-related mandates, objectives and interests perform
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the opposite way as the security institutions do prior to sanctions. The results suggest that
economic institutions have no pacifying effect on economic sanctions; moreover, they facilitate
sanction imposition and make it more likely.
One of the reasons for this might be that high levels of connectedness through IGOs with
an economic mandate imply a high level of trade-connectedness. States that share membership
in IGOs are inherently more likely to interact. This interaction can be cooperative, but it can
also be competitive and even violent. Following this logic, states that trade heavily with each
other are more likely to join in the same set of institutions (Boehmer and Nordstrom 2008) and
the intensity of trade ties among the members of a trade IGO increases the likelihood that an
economic dispute will arise within the dyad. It may also be the case that states join into trade
institutions as a remedy for already existing contentious issues and to create interdependencies
that will pacify the existing contentious issues.
If this is the case, the results show that economic IGOs do not perform well in fulfilling this
expectation. Furthermore, unlike the way that the security institutions perform, it does not seem
like economic institutions are doing a good job in solving disputes through enforcement and
effective dispute settlement mechanisms. Lastly, it can be argued that some trade institutions
are highly asymmetrical and can increase direct competition between the member states, which
in return increases the likelihood of trade disputes (Gilpin 1987).
Evaluating the results of the first model together with the coefficient estimates of Joint
Membership - Security and Joint Membership - Economy uncovers an interesting an dynamic
about the influence of IGOs in bilateral relations. It seems like the positive coefficient on Joint
Membership is likely to be driven by the trade related sanctions and IGOs with an economic
mandate. The frequency of sanction impositions, where the issue under contention is trade-
related and the IGOs with an economic mandate have a higher frequency than security-related
impositions and IGOs with a security mandate. It is evident that the pacifying effect of IGOs
is limited to security institutions and economic disputes are not successfully handled by the
economic IGOs.
The evaluate the substantive effect of joint membership and its breakdown based on the
mandates of IGOs on the likelihood of sanctions, I calculated predicted probabilities for the
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first three models in Table 4. 23 It is important to note that the predicted probabilities are very
small, given the rarity of sanction impositions in the sample; therefore it is more informative
to focus on relative predicted probabilities, instead of the absolute magnitudes, and the trends
revealed by the figures.
Figure 2 shows that a dyad with no joint membership in security institutions is 25% more
likely to experience a sanction imposition than a dyad with one joint membership in security
organizations. Interestingly, the impact of an each additional security IGO on the probability
of sanction imposition is decreasing marginally and concavely. It makes sense, because each
additional security IGO is not expected to facilitate unique information, but there will be a
significant overlap in the information provided by each security institutions.
Figure 3 reveals an opposite pattern. It graphically shows that the increase in the number
shared membership in economic institutions increase the probability of sanction onset. When
we compare Figure 2 with Figure 3, it is proven that the marginal effect of an increase in the
number of shared membership in economic IGOs is significantly less than the marginal effect
of an increase in the number of shared membership in security IGOs.
Model 4 in Table 4 tests the third extension of the second hypothesis (H2(c)). The model
examines the impact of joint membership in security institutions on the probability of sanction
impositions, irrespective of the issue under contention. The model reveals that the findings
about the pacifying effect of security IGOs are not generalizable to the sanctions that are beyond
the mandate and expertise of security institutions. The pacifying effect of security IGOs found
in the second model appears to be limited to the sanctions, where the issue under contention
is security related. The results confirm my expectation about the centrality of relevancy to the
effectiveness of IGOs in pacifying sanctioning behavior. The lack of significant coefficient
estimate on the variable Joint Membership-Security reveals that security IGOs have no impact
on the probability of sanctions, other than the security-related ones.
23See Appendix for the predicted probability graphs.
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Analyzing the Control Variables
Looking across the models in Table 3 and 4, most of the control variables perform as ex-
pected and the differences across the models worth attention. First of all, it is important to note
that all the control variables act the same way both in the models with threats as the dependent
variable and sanctions as the dependent variable. In this paper, I evaluate the two stages as
separate; however, I have found that they got affected by similar factors in a similar way, which
strengthens the need for future work that conceptualizes the two stages as integral parts of the
same process, instead of treating them separately.
Across all models, US variable is positive and highly significant, which is in line with the
conventional wisdom and the literature given the fact that the majority of sanction episodes
are initiated by the US against a broad range of target countries. Despite the inclusion of low
profile sanction cases in the TIES Data, the United States remains the most prolific user of
sanctions. As stated above, 256 of 621 sanctions during the years 1950-2000 had been imposed
by the United States. Some scholars present a domestic politics story and argue that American
policymakers use sanctions as a way to display strong leadership during international crises
(Whang 2011); whereas others focus on the country’s dominant market power and preferred
use of sanctions to promote democracy and human rights abroad (Wallace 2013). However, the
discussion of sanctions as an American foreign policy tool is out of the scope of this paper.
In line with the existing literature, the results confirm that democracies are more likely
to use sanctions as a foreign policy tool. The literature exploring the reasons why present
mixed findings. Some argue that the domestic and institutional constraints on democracies
restricts the use of military power, therefore sanctions appear to be a viable option either to
change target’s behavior or show discontent with policies of the target (Cox and Drury 2006).
Others argue that sanctions are designed specifically to benefit some interest groups in the
sender country, therefore democracies tend to impose sanctions more often as a response to
the pressures coming from interest groups (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2013). The variable for
Democratic Sender is positive across all modes, but it does not attain statistical significance
in Model 2, implying that the regime type does not explain the imposition of security related
sanctions.
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The coefficient estimate of Foreign Policy Similarity is negative across all models, as ex-
pected; however it does not attain statistical significance in the third model. This is interesting,
because it indicates that having similar foreign policy interests does not necessarily imply that
economic interests will also converge. It is evident that the level of affinity does not have an
impact on the senders’ decision to impose trade-related sanctions. I think this finding also re-
inforces the finding suggesting that the joint membership in economic IGOs does not decrease
the probability of sanction imposition in that dyad.
The results for Trade are very similar across all models and as the volume of trade within the
dyad increases, the probability of sanction onset increases, independent from the issue under
contention. This finding is in contradiction with some of the previous literature indicating
that states that are highly dependent on one another shy away from sanctioning, because the
sanctions cause welfare losses not only in the target’s, but also in the sender’s economy. It
is also a plausible explanation to suggest that higher levels of trade dependence create greater
opportunities for friction between the sides. For instance, despite the fact that Canada is highly
dependent on the US in terms of trade, Canada imposes sanctions on the US very frequently.
It may also be the case that the reasons why states trade with one another are the same as the
reasons why they share membership in IGOs.
Interestingly, GDP does not attain statistical significance in none of the models. The results
suggest that the relative GDP of the sender to the target has no impact on the probability of
sanction imposition. The earlier literature has proven that states with higher GDP are more
likely to impose sanctions on target with relatively lower GDP. Having a closer look at the
data reveals that there are a lot of sanction episodes initiated by economically weaker states
targeting wealthier states. The role of power on the decision of sanction imposition requires a
further theoretical and empirical attention.
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Conclusion and Future Direction
This paper explores the extent to which intergovernmental organizations influence state
decisions on sanctions. While many studies on IGOs analyze their influence in militarized in-
terstate disputes, I aim to shift the attention towards lower levels of conflicts, which are more
frequent than militarized disputes in the international system. I find that IGOs are facilitators of
sanction threats; whereas they pacify sanctioning behavior at the imposition stage, conditional
on the issue of the sanction and the mandates of IGOs. Interestingly, I find that the facilitator
effect of IGOs is only present for trade-related IGOs on trade-related sanction and the pacifying
effect of IGOs at the imposition stage is only present for IGOs with a security mandate on sanc-
tions where the issue under contention is also security related. The findings on the pacifying
effect of security IGOs is in line with the findings of Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004),
where they show that not all IGOs, but IGOs with a security mandate promote peace among its
members.
The results of this study also reveal the importance of having a closer look at and a more
nuanced approach to IGOs. The literature has to move beyond a simple count of shared mem-
bership as a measure of the level of connectedness between states and account for the variation
among different IGOs. It may be the fact that it is almost impossible to come up with a single
classification of IGOs that will be used for all studies on IGOs, however it is important for
every study to come up with their own classifications based on the question that they are asking
and the theory they propose. The same need is evident for the sanctions literature, too. Not
all sanctions are the same and the underlying mechanisms of each sanction are different from
another. Here, I propose a classification based on the issue under contention, following some
of the existing literature on sanctions; but different typologies are also possible, depending on
the question being asked.
The discussion about the pacifying effect of IGOs in low intensity conflicts is also very
policy-relevant. The findings suggest that IGOs with an economic mandate has to focus more
on building stronger and effective dispute settlement mechanisms as well as other means to
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facilitate credible information among the member states in order to render sanction imposi-
tions unnecessary. The results show that economic IGOs should find ways to strengthen their
information provision and dispute settlement mechanisms. The increase in the frequency of
trade-related sanctions and the decrease in the frequency of security sanctions are also indica-
tive of such a contrast between the institutions and the extent to which they succeed in pacifying
relations among their member states.
One of the problems that this paper suffers from is its treatment of the threat stage and
the imposition stage of sanctions separately. I acknowledge that it is a much better approach
to conceptualize two stages as a part of the same process. This paper fails to account for the
reasons why some sanction threats succeed and others fail and why some sanction cases move
to the imposition stage; whereas others do not. Or, why are some sanction episodes initiated
by an imposition without being preceded by threats? Those questions have to be addressed in
future work in order to fully comprehend sanctioning behavior of states.
Another potential way to build on this paper is to go beyond the dyadic analysis and focus on
the systemic level. One of the mechanisms with which IGOs influence decisions on sanctions
is informational. Instead of looking at the information generated and facilitated by the IGOs in
a given dyad, we can examine the information provided by the IGOs as well as international
regimes to the international system as a whole. Periods of institutional stability and the domi-
nance of an international regime can be evaluated as periods characterized by the availability of
credible information; whereas institutional changes and international regime shifts can be seen
as breaks in information flow. Therefore, the former should be associated with a decrease in the
frequency of the sanctions; whereas the latter should necessitate more sanctions as a means to
solve the disputes. The end of the Bretton Woods era, the GATT’s transformation to the WTO,
the institutional changes during the European integration, the end of the Cold War, 9/11 and the
2008 financial crises can be identified as instances of breaks in informational flow. I think there
is a room in literature to identify the patterns of sanctions and to theorize about the systemic
reasons behind those patterns.
I do not think that the increased frequency of threats and impositions of sanctions match
with the amount of scholarly research conducted in the area. It is evident that there is still a lot
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to learn about sanction, especially in relation to other substantive areas, such as terrorism, civil
wars, international monitoring, international political economy and human rights. The literature
on sanctions will benefit from further theorizing and expanding the scope of the literature by
creating linkages with other areas in the field of international relations.
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Appendix
List of IGOs with Security Mandate
1. Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
2. ANZUS Council
3. Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion
4. Central Treaty Organization
5. Euro Atlantic Partnership Council
6. European Union
7. Far East Commission
8. Imperial Defense Committee
9. Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission
10. Inter-American Defense Board
11. League of Arab States
12. Multinational Force and Observers
13. North Atlantic Treaty Organization
14. Organization for African Unity
15. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
16. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
17. Warsaw Treaty Organization
18. Western European Union
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